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Abstract
An operating target is suggested for a monetary authority in a
simple world. In this world currency movements should be weighted by
the required reserve ratio on demand deposits. With this weighting of
currency, control of the money supply is independent of the required
reserve ratio, so that reserve requirements can be kept low without
giving up control. This result holds in a Poole type world of an
optimal weighting on money changes and interest changes for an
intermediate target, and the optimal target weight for the interest rate
is also given for such an intermediate target. The simple model is
expanded for control of broad money and interest rates.

This is a report from a simple and pleasant world. In this simple
and pleasant world the monetary authorities have as a final target
nominal income (or some linear function of it). They have read Poole
and have as an intermediate target
(1) a&i + (1-a) J =
where " indicates changes, M. is narrow money, I is some interest
rate(s), and a is a weight chosen optimally to minimize final target
deviations as taught by Poole. The monetary authorities have chosen
open market operations as their one and only tool with which to meet
their target. However, they have found two related problems in
conducting their policy. Although they see I all the time, they only
see M
1
every so often, and when they do see it, they often find out it
is not what they expected. Thus, they keep missing their target and in
addition find that they have to work very hard (do a lot of open market
operations) to get back on target. This leads to the other problem.
They work very hard every so often but most of the time they have
nothing to do since they have not seen a new M. . This would not be so
bad except that other government agencies are complaining of gross
inefficiencies, and there have even been calls for privatization.
In order to achieve better control and, of course secondarily, to
lessen the complaints about their inefficiency, a new control technique
has been proposed—an operating target. The monetary authorities from
their own balance sheet know (well, almost know) both the amount of
reserves and currency issued on a daily basis. Although they have heard
2of other central banks that had tried somewhat similar techniques
through something called base control or reserve control in olden days,
they believe this violates the spirit of Poole's idea which is to use
all the information available.
Their proposed operating target is
(2) R + Xxd + X 2I =
where R is reserves, C is currency issued, and X
1
and JU are weights to
be determined optimally. Since in this simple world, the only reserve
requirement is on demand deposits, and since there are no excess
reserves and commercial banks are certainly prohibited from borrowing,
then R = rD and the operating target is
( 3 ) rD * Xj£ + X 2 T = 0.
The monetary authorities know that income does not change from one day
to the next so that changes in the demand for currency and demand
deposits are
C = k.T + u_
(4)
D = kdT + ud
where u
c
and u. are shock terms.
Putting equations (4) into (3) results in
(5) j- 1rV X i Uc)
4>i
where <p^ = rkd + X 1 k(. + X2 . Changes in M 1 are
(6) ^ - a+ Q~ <j>2I+ (uc+ud )
where <£2 is k + k.. Given equation (6) the operating target is
(?)
<fr3j + a(uc+ud ) =
where <£, = 1 - a + a<£
2
.
Given equation (5), equation (7) is
. / rud+\ 1 uc \
and the operating target is
Now equation (8) seems particularly pleasant because it can be
made zero if a0
1
= 0,A.
1
= <p,r , and this immediately suggests that
(9) X 1 = r
and with X
1
= r, then a<p^ = 0,r, or
(10, W(^=)
The proposed operating target then seems very nice indeed. The
monetary authorities can now control their intermediate target
perfectly, and, of course secondarily, keep busy each day as new
information comes in from their balance sheet. In addition to all this
and the virtue of its simplicity, there are still more virtues. The
monetary authorities have noted that X. = r is independent of a so that
even for some old-timers who believe that M. should be the sole
intermediate target, the appropriate level for X. is still r. Of
course, M. could be controlled perfectly given H. > r if only a were set
at one, and thus X
2
at zero. If only the old-timers had known that
neither base or reserve control would work, but that instead currency
changes must be weighted by the reserve requirement on demand deposits!
But there is even still more virtue in this proposed operating
target. The monetary authorities have calculated the variance of both
2 2
the interest rate and M. if the operating target is used. If a , a.,
i c d
and o
cd are the variances and covariance of the currency and demand
deposit shock terms then
,,,, n 2 (
ql+ qd+2Q cd )(11) J
" u + i-*\ 2
and
' 1-a \ 2
2
Of the two variances the monetary authorities have found a to be the
M
l
most interesting. In the past some of the old-timers who wanted to
control M. only and not knowing to set X
1
= r, implored the monetary
authorities to raise the reguired reserve ratio to 100 percent. Of
course, the commercial banks did not view this proposal with great
favor. The resultant setting of r by the monetary authorities had
become something of a compromise even in this simple world, pushed
higher because of the supposed better control and should lower by the
plight of the banks. Now from eguation (12) it is clear that control of
the money supply is completely independent of the level of r. No longer
must there be compromise in this simple world since r can be set as low
as needed without reducing control of M
1
.
This result for the setting of r is particularly important for the
monetary authorities because they have recently noted some bothersome
complexities arising in their simple world. It seems some banks, and
even some non-banks 1, have started issuing new kinds of liabilities
which seem to be treated by the populace as close substitutes for
currency and demand deposits. Furthermore the monetary authorities
expect this trend to continue and increase in importance. This has even
led to some disarray amongst the monetary authorities some of whom have
suggested a new broader definition of money, called M
2 ,
to use in their
Poole control. The development of these new substitutes has raised
other problems of fairness for banks and other financial institutions.
6Some have even mumbled about something called "level playing fields."
But with this new found result for r, the monetary authorities believe
they have a simplifying (naturally) way out.
They have found that with M
2 ,
their new intermediate target will
be
(!') $M2 + (1-0) J =
where fl is not necessarily equal to the a for M. , but is just as simply
determined. They would define M2 to include all these new substitute
n
assets, 2 x-, each of which has a demand
i=l
<
4 ')
*| = JCi-f + VL± .
and each of which could have a required reserve ratio of r-. Their
proposed operating target will now be
(3') zb + £ riii1 + A^C + X 2 I.
Without reviewing all the simple algebra we can just note that with <p^
n
now equal to rk. + 2 r-k- + A..k + \~, with <£2 now equal to
n i=l
k
c
+ kd + 2 k-, and with <£, now equal to l-fi+fl<£2 , the new target will be
i=l
+-*M»-¥)£+-*)
7Now equation (8') is still pleasant, although not quite so simple
as equation (8), because by sight it can be made zero if
(9') Xx »r»zi
for all r^ and if
(10') X^r[±&
Now previous to their finding that r can be very low and not
lessen the control of money, these results might have been impossible to
achieve since it might not be possible to have required reserve ratios
the same for all these new substitute assets. But since r can be very
low indeed, there seems to be no reason not to have the same r for all
assets in &*• This, of course, would have the further advantage of
being a "level playing field." They have noted and even emphasized that
including an asset in M
2
which has no reserve requirement would not be
good because it would enter equation (8') as u-fi and there would be no
way to perfectly control their target. Thus M
2
should include only
assets which have a (low) reserve requirement and should exclude all
others. They are aware that the future may bring the introduction of
still more new types of assets which may be substitutes for those assets
in M
2 ,
but they feel comfortable in being able to adjust simply to this
possibility if it does occur.
So life is simple and pleasant in this world. The monetary
authorities will have just enough work to do and it will be evenly
8distributed over time, if they adopt their new operating target
technique. They will now be able to meet their intermediate target
completely and as a result their final target will be better met. The
banks will be happy playing on a level field and having lower reserve
requirements. There will be just enough in the way of remaining
arguments to make life interesting. Some old-timers will continue to
insist on controlling only money, others on controlling only interest
rates, and there will be continuing arguments as to whether they should
use M
1#
or M
2
or, in the future, some M,. But such arguments seem just
enough to fill the monetary authorities still substantial breaks during
their working days with exciting conversation.
It has been noted that reports from simple and pleasant worlds
often provide useful insights for our complex and sophisticated one.
Might this be the case here, or can nothing useful be gained? We might
do well to consider the possible effects of several complexities before
making any decisions as to the virtues of using the simple world's
monetary authorities' techniques in our own world.
We might note that in our world we do not quite see reserves and
currency in the hands of the public on a day-to-day basis since we
cannot observe vault cash behavior. In addition our banks do have
excess reserves and do borrow from the Federal Reserve. Changes in
these items on a day-to-day basis, however, are quantitatively very
small and thus should not significantly affect the results. There will
simply be some small remaining uncertainty not present in the simple
world.
9In our world economic agents are supposed to be very sophisticated
indeed. If the Federal Reserve were to use the simple world's control
technique, this would undoubtedly alter the behavior of agents in our
world. In particular, the demand functions for the various assets in M
1
or M2 might shift. This would mean that the k-'s and the u.'s would
shift from what they are at present. The Federal Reserve would have to
be careful in adjusting to its new policy not to use previous estimates
for the k. 's and u-'s. Once the new policy is in effect, however, there
is no reason to believe that behavior will change on a day-to-day basis
in reaction to day-to-day Federal Reserve behavior since this behavior
will be unknown at the time. Thus sophisticated and forward looking
agents will not negate this behavior.
Finally we might note the rather cavalier way in which the
interest rate is treated by the simple world's monetary authorities.
Since they use the symbol I for changes in the interest rate in their
Poole target and as determinants of the demands for all the monetary
assets, they must be assuming the same I for both situations. In our
more complex world, the demand functions for monetary assets must depend
on the structure of interest rates or interest rate differentials as
well as the level of some interest rate. This suggests a serious
difficulty in using the simple results. However, it should be noted
that this can be overcome if each interest rate is a linear function of
"the" interest rate, by an appropriate change in the k variable for each
asset.
Although this by no means exhausts the potential problems stemming
from the use of the simple model, there seems to be at least a
10
possibility that yet again a simple world may prove instructive for our
own. Any comments?
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